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INTRODUCTION
The stock of public school buildings constructed during the baby boom is aging
along with that generation of Americans. Soon much of this building stock will have to
be replaced.(FN1) The financing of this rebuilding of America’s schools is an emergent
political issue of considerable importance. Given these pressures on school
construction financing, any proposal that promises to substantially lower the price tag
for this reconstruction garners considerable public interest and potential support. One
such proposal is the elimination of prevailing wage regulations that in 31 states and the
District of Columbia govern the payment of wage rates on public school
construction.(FN2) Prevailing wage laws require that state mandated wage rates be
paid on public road and building construction. The purpose of these laws is to
encourage collective bargaining in construction and to discourage the payment on
public works of wages below those prevailing locally. Critics of prevailing wage laws
assert that these laws raise public construction costs and discourage non-union
contractors from bidding on public works. 
Some politicians and school officials believe that the elimination of prevailing wage
regulations could cut public school construction costs by 10 to 40 percent. For
instance, Gary Johnson, the Governor of New Mexico, in his 1997 address to the New
Mexico state legislature foretold a 33 percent reduction in total state school
construction costs from the elimination of the state’s prevailing wage law.(FN3) In Ohio
in 1997 the state legislature held hearings on the possible elimination of prevailing
wage regulations for school construction. School officials foresaw substantial cost
savings from such an exemption. For instance, Rick Savors, Deputy Director of
Legislative Networks for the Ohio School Boards Association (OSBA) testified that: 
The OSBA believes that the state’s current prevailing wage law adds
significant costs to a project and limits the number of contractors willing to
offer bids on school contracts ... The cost savings for districts, taxpayers and
the state can be significant ... those savings could reach perhaps as high as
30-40 percent in some instances.(FN4) 
In the same hearings, Richard Maxwell, Deputy Executive Director for Government
Relations for the Buckeye Association of School Administrators (BASA) testified: 
BASA supports the exclusion of the prevailing wage provision for school
construction and facility improvements. This exclusion will benefit Ohio’s
schools by extending the scarce taxpayer’s dollars to improve facilities. As a
superintendent of schools for 23 years in districts I managed many school
buildings built in 1912 through 1964. We had an extensive program of
renovation and improvement of these buildings ... BASA members tell us they
believe they can do 10-15 percent more construction and renovation if the
prevailing wage provisions did not apply to school construction and
renovations.(FN5) 
The primary basis for asserting that the elimination of prevailing wage regulations
on school construction will substantially lower total school construction costs is the
proposition that absent these regulations, wage rates on school construction would be
substantially lower. In consideration of Ohio Senate Bill 102, Jim Shirey, Legislative
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Liaison for the Athens Ohio City Schools Board of Education made this argument
explicit. 
“Prevailing Wage” is nothing less than price fixing perpetrated by state
government. Prevailing Wage sets the price of construction labor at union
scale, regardless if the local labor market. One of the contractors who testified
on this bill before the Senate Finance Committee did a study of actual
construction costs and he showed very clearly that Prevailing Wage can inflate
the cost of construction labor by as much as 60 percent.(FN6) 
There are no academic studies on the relationship between prevailing wage
regulations and school construction costs. This paper attempts to inform the ongoing
debate over the impact of the prevailing wage laws on school construction costs by
using a unique dataset from Canada. Wages including benefits constitute about 30
percent of the total construction cost, excluding land acquisition and architectural
costs.(FN7) The province of British Columbia (B.C.) established the Skill Development
and Fair Wage Policy (SDFWP) on March 30, 1992. It mandated payment of the
prevailing wage on public construction projects and determined “fair” wage schedules
for each occupation within the building trades. The fair wage was set at about 90
percent of the collectively bargained wage rate for each construction occupation in B.C.
The B.C. experiment with prevailing wages provides a new opportunity to make an
empirical assessment of the debated question of whether or not prevailing wage
regulations measurably increase school construction costs. The objective of this paper
is to compare final construction costs before and after the SDFWP was implemented
in order to determine whether legislated wages resulted in higher school construction
cost in British Columbia. For this purpose we will use final cost data from new
elementary and secondary public school construction projects from six school districts
in B.C. tendered between 1989 and 1995. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first briefly review the empirical studies on
the impact of the prevailing wage laws on public construction, and state the
contribution of this paper to that literature. This section will be followed by the
description of the B.C. data. We will then estimate the impact of the SDFWP on school
construction costs by multi-variate regression analysis. 
THE LITERATURE
In this section we will first outline the general features of the debate over the
prevailing wage laws. In the last part of the section we will summarize the specific
findings concerning school construction. 
The literature on the construction cost impact of prevailing wage laws focuses
almost exclusively on the U.S. federal Davis Bacon Act. With one exception, the
Davis-Bacon literature estimates cost savings from the elimination of the federal
regulation to range from one to three percent of total federal construction costs. The
one exception estimates a 26 percent savings in rural building construction from the
elimination of federal prevailing wage regulations. 
Because the Davis Bacon Act was passed in 1931, there is no possibility of
comparing the cost of construction prior to and subsequent to the passage of this act.
This leaves three avenues of research. The first estimates what wage rates would be
paid on federal construction absent prevailing wage regulations and then tries to
compute what total costs would be under two wage rate regimes. The second exploits
a moment of time in 1971 when the Davis Bacon act was suspended for 34 days. The
last compares the cost of construction on public works with comparable private
construction projects. 
The first and most common method in the literature tries to assess what wage rates
would be paid on federal construction absent Davis-Bacon. With this calculation in
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hand, these studies then attempt to estimate theoretically what construction costs
would be under these hypothetical wage rates. Finally, these studies then attempt to
compare hypothetical construction costs under hypothetical wage payments. As
expected, this line of research is fraught with debates over the methodology. 
Most studies of this type concluded that the Davis-Bacon wage rate is biased
upwards toward the union wage, and consequently predicted that Davis Bacon raises
the cost of construction.(FN8) The estimated cost inflation attributable to this wage
differential is in the order of 1.5 to 3 percent of public construction expenditure.(FN9)
On the other hand, Bourdon and Levitt found no such bias,(FN10) and Allen argued
that the Davis-Bacon effect is modest, raising construction costs merely by 0.3 to 0.4
percent.(FN11) 
Thieblot adopted a second, more direct approach by taking advantage of President
Nixon’s temporary suspension of the Davis-Bacon in 1971.(FN12) Thieblot compared
bid prices of projects tendered but not contracted in this period with their rebid prices
in the following period. He concluded that in the absence of Davis-Bacon the lowest
bid were lower by 0.63 percent. Thieblot’s subsequent reexamination of the data led
him to the conclusion that savings, including administration and wage costs, would be
as much as 4.74 percent if the Davis-Bacon were repealed.(FN13) 
Fraundorf et al., followed a third methodology.(FN14) They utilized multivariate
methods to determine the impact of prevailing wage laws on construction costs directly.
Fraundorf et al., compared 215 federal and private non-residential construction projects
controlling for non-labor cost factors (such as the type of structure, technical
characteristics, size, and geographic location). They found that federal projects were 26
percent more expensive than the private projects, and attributed this difference to the
federal Davis-Bacon Act. 
The Fraundorf result is substantially higher than previous studies and may be the
academic basis for claims by school officials that total construction costs can be cut
by ten to 40 percent through the elimination of prevailing wage regulations. However,
the Fraundorf study has two weaknesses that the present study overcomes. First, the
Fraundorf study is not a study of school construction costs. It may be that school
construction is distinct from rural building construction. Second, the Fraundorf study
derives its projected cost savings from a comparison of public building costs to private
building costs. If private buildings differ from public buildings in ways that are not
adequately controlled for, this may conflate cost differences derived from public-private
building differences with cost differences derived from prevailing wage regulations. Our
study attempts to overcome these potentially confounding factors by focusing only on
public school construction. 
Because state and provincial prevailing wage regulations differ in their specifications
and implementations, and school construction is regulated at the state and provincial
level, a variety of case studies are needed. Our study is limited to assessing the effect
of one prevailing wage law in one province at one particular period of time. 
THE DATA
The recent experience of B.C. with the SDFWP permits an assessment of the
impact of wage regulation on the school construction cost by controlling for many
factors that confounded the results of the studies mentioned above. The empirical
analysis of this paper is based on tender data compiled by the Construction Labour
Relations Association of B.C. from six school districts (out of 18) for a study of the
impact of the SDFWP on construction costs.(FN15) These school districts are all
located in the southern Lower Mainland education region of B.C. and are
geographically in close proximity. The data cover 54 new school construction projects
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tendered and completed between 1989 and 1995. Of the 54 tenders, 25 were received
before March 31, 1992 and 29 were received afterwards, allowing the comparison of
costs before and after the establishment of the SDFWP. All projects cost more than
$250,000(FN16) and were therefore covered by the Fair Wage Policy during the period
it was in effect. In addition to the final cost, the raw data also provide information on
the list of bidders and bid prices for all projects, the contract price, the type of school
(elementary or secondary), and structural characteristics of projects, including gross
area, construction type, foundations, and special features (e.g. remote location, difficult
site). For many projects estimated and/or actual durations of construction are available.
Thus, while the number of observations is relatively small, the data have the advantage
of being appropriately detailed. In addition, we also collected information on the size
of the general contractors to whom the contract was awarded. 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of school types across the two periods. The
number and the type of schools are distributed approximately evenly across the two
periods. Gross sizes of elementary schools range from 2,017 to 3,950 square-meters,
while secondary school gross sizes range from 6,033 to 15,787 square-meters. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the unit (square-meter) final cost (in 1989
prices). The average unit cost is $1,423 but there is a significant difference between
the pre- and post-SDFWP periods. After the establishment of the Policy, the average
unit final cost increases by $207, from $1,308 to $1,515. This 16 percent difference,
which is statistically significant at the one percent level, suggests that the SDFWP
constitutes a serious burden on the public purse. 
In the next section, we will address this question in a multi-variate context
controlling for other potentially relevant factors that may impinge on the unit cost of
construction. 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
The cost of construction, by definition, is equal to the sum of the bid price and the
cost of change orders. The unit bid price, in turn, is equal to the sum of the estimated
cost of production and the profit margin. Let FP stand for the unit final price, m be the
mark-up rate, and CO be the total change order cost including the mark-up on change
orders.(FN17) Estimated total cost of construction, in turn, can be written as the sum
of labor and non-labor costs. Letting w and n stand for the prices of labor and
non-labor inputs, and L and N stand for the quantities of labor and non-labor inputs,
the final cost can be written as: 
This equation is the basis of the empirical model to be used in predicting the cost
of construction. Four sets of factors that potentially affect the independent variables are
the physical features of the project, state of the construction business cycle and the
degree of competition among contractors, regulatory environment in the labor market,
and characteristics of the contractor. 
Physical features of the project (including the size, the type of foundation and
frame, location, number of stories, type of school) influence the quantity and the type
of inputs. Fraundorf et al. controlled for technical characteristics such as foundation,
frame, exterior walls, floor finishing, and frame type. In our sample there is little, if any,
variation in technical characteristics for which information is available. Structural
specifications of all projects were reported in the cost estimation forms prepared by the
architect prior to bidding. Almost all schools are steel frame structures with slab on
grade foundation. The type of school — elementary vs. secondary — summarizes most
of the other technical differences. Secondary schools are larger than elementary and
require approximately twice as long to build. If there exist economies of scale to size
or longer construction period, secondary schools are expected to have lower unit costs.
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Finally, secondary schools are more likely to include higher unit cost structures (e.g.
laboratories) on the one hand, lower cost areas such as sports fields, on the
other.(FN18) These considerations make it difficult to form an expectation on how the
school type would affect the unit cost. In order to control for these technical features
we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of one for secondary schools and
zero for the elementary. We also utilize dummies for school districts to control for any
potential location effects. 
Input prices vary with the state of the economy, reflecting relative abundance of the
labor, capital and intermediate goods. Hence the unit cost is expected to be
pro-cyclical. The impact of the cycle on the mark-up is indeterminate. During the
expansion of the economic activity, for instance, the firm may raise the profit margins
taking advantage of rising demand. It is also conceivable that the firm shaves the
mark-up in order to protect its market share from potential entrants attracted to the
industry. In order to capture the construction industry business cycle effects we fitted
a linear annual trend to the values of non-residential building permits (in constant
prices) over the 1989-1995 period by ordinary least squares. We then measured the
cyclical fluctuation in the construction sector activity as the percentage deviations of
actual values of permits from the trend values. It should be borne in mind that this
measurement of the cycle based on the annual experience of only seven years is
crude. Quarterly data would probably yield a more precise profile of the cycles, but
they are not yet available. 
The immediate effect of the SDFWP on the construction cost is via the wage rate.
If the legislated wage is higher than the market wage, then labor costs increase. This
anticipation is the basis of most of the empirical studies on the cost effect of the
prevailing wage laws. It should be kept in mind that this cost effect would be tempered
by substitution between different qualities of labor as well as between labor and capital.
Total cost is not expected to rise proportionately because contractors facing higher
labor costs would alter techniques of production, employing more capital and skilled
labor intensive techniques. 
In addition, the SDFWP may also affect the final cost by changing the type of
uncertainty facing the bidders. Assuming that there is a monotonic relationship between
the accepted bid price and the final cost of construction, the final cost would be
influenced by the degree of competition because each contractor takes into
consideration the number of bidders its competing against in determining the mark-up.
The auction theory predicts that under the “independent private values” model, where
bidders’ estimation errors of cost of construction are independent, bidders lower their
mark-ups in the face of higher competition in order to maximize their chances of
winning the contract. This “competition effect” implies that the mark-up and the bid
price are inversely related to the number of bidders. In the alternative “common values”
model, estimation errors are interdependent. The latter would be the case if all bidders
face some common uncertainty concerning the cost of construction, which may be
attributable to factors such as weather conditions or the state of the general labor
market. When the common values model applies, bidders would be subject to the
so-called “winner’s curse.” The winner’s curse refers to the fact that in a first-price
sealed-bid auction, although expected value of each bidder’s bid is unbiased, the
winning bid will be biased downward, or that the winner is the one who underestimated
the construction cost the most. Consequently, the winner is likely to make less than
anticipated profits or may even lose money.(FN19) Since rational bidders do not make
consistent errors, the optimum bidding requires experienced bidders protect themselves
from the winner’s curse by adding a surcharge to the estimated cost. Optimal behavior
under the common values model requires this surcharge to rise with the number of
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competing bidders, offsetting the competition effect. To the extent that the SDFWP
reduces uncertainty over labor costs, the relationship between the bid price and the
degree of competition measured in terms of the number of bidders would change from
more to less positive or from less to more negative following the implementation of the
SDFWP. In the extreme case where introduction of the SDFWP results in a switch
from common to private values model, the degree of competition would influence bid
prices positively before the passage of the Policy and negatively afterwards.(FN20) 
The cost of construction also depends on the capital stock and capacity utilization
of the contractor. If there are economies of scale associated with larger size, final cost
should decline with the size of the firm. If the contractor faces diminishing returns as
it approaches full capacity, final cost would increase. Ideally, one should be able to
control for the capital and the level of activity separately, but the data do not allow this.
Instead, it is possible to build a dataset for the “size” of the contractor, defined as the
average annual volume of sales. The obvious shortcoming of this variable is that it
cannot distinguish between the capital stock and capacity utilization, and therefore its
impact on the final cost is indeterminate. In the absence of data that can make finer
distinctions, we used this as a proxy to control for the firm characteristics. We
constructed data series on size from the Canadata database and the Journal of
Commerce’s “Substantial Performers” and “Leaders” reports of the leading contractors
for 1992, 1995 and 1996.(FN21) 
Theory suggests little about determinants of change order cost. There is some
evidence indicating that cost overruns may be directly related to the size of the project,
and that the cost overrun is more likely if the bid is below the owner’s estimate.(FN22)
Although it is possible to control for the area of the school, data on owner’s pretender
estimate are far from complete in our sample and therefore not included as an
explanatory variable. There may be a direct link between the change order cost and
the SDFWP, however. One method whereby a contractor who has underbid may
recoup his/her losses is negotiating over the price of the change order.(FN23) If we
follow this argument, change order costs are expected to be higher in the SDFWP
period when contractors are more likely to be victims of the winner’s curse. We
calculated the cost of change orders for the school projects as a percentage of the
accepted bid price. For all the projects in the dataset, the average change order cost
was 2.08 percent of the lowest bid price. For the pre- and post-SDFWP periods,
however, the mean values of percentage change order costs were 2.54 and 1.68
percent, respectively. The difference in means is statistically significant at the 10
percent level, providing some evidence for the hypothesis that change orders declined
after the establishment of the Policy. Hence it may be hypothesized that the SDFWP
affects the final cost directly by lowering the change order cost. 
Finally, the final cost of construction may change gradually over time for reasons
other than those listed above. Such factors may include technological changes which
raise productivity and lower cost over time, improving methods of cost estimation,
gradual specification changes in construction,(FN24) or adjustment process of
contractors to the new legal regime. In order to capture the effect of these gradual
changes we add a monthly time index starting in January 1989 to the explanatory
variables. Since it is impossible to distinguish between the separate effects of these
secular factors on this monthly time trend we do not have any priors on the direction
of its impact on the final cost. 
The project size was excluded from the final regression equation because it was
highly correlated with the school type and therefore introduced collinearity problems.
The estimated regression equation is then: 
ln(Final cost) = b0 + b1 Secondary school + b2 Construction cycle +b3 (1/Number
of bidder) + b4i Contractor sizei + b5 Time + b6j Districtj + u (2) 
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Final cost is the square-meter final cost of construction deflated by the
non-residential construction price index, Number of bidders is the number of bidders
per tender, Contractor size is a vector of dummy variables for contractor size
categories (indexed by i), Time is the monthly time trend starting in Jauary 1989, and
District is a vector of dummy variables for the six school districts (indexed by j). u is
the error term. 
ESTIMATION
We estimated regression equation (2) for the whole period, as well as the pre- and
post-SDFWP periods by the ordinary least squares method. This method not only
shows how the SDFWP affected the final cost controlling for these variables, but also
if and how the response of the final cost to these variables were altered after the
establishment of the Policy. In estimation, contractor size turned out to be statistically
insignificant in all regressions and, given degree of freedom constraints, we decided to
exclude these from the final regressions results reported on Table 3. 
Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of equation (2) for two specifications of the
model. In the first specification, reported by columns (1) to (3), the time index is
omitted. In column (1) the regression is run over the complete sample. According to
the adjusted R2 of column (1) the equation explains 33 percent of the total variation
of unit final costs for the whole sample. Columns (2) and (3) apply the equation
separately to the pre- and post-SDFWP sub-periods. We tested the hypothesis that the
coefficients of explanatory variables are equal across the two sub-periods. This test
yielded the F-value of 5.73, which is statistically significant at the one percent level.
Rejection of the hypothesis of stability of coefficients across the periods indicates that
it is inappropriate to pool the pre- and post-SDFWP periods in estimating the final cost
regression equation. 
Indeed the explanatory power of the regression increases significantly once the
sample is divided on the basis of the legal regime. Adjusted coefficients of
determination reported in columns (2) and (3) are 0.55 and 0.48, substantially higher
than what is found in the case of the full sample. According to the second column of
Table 3, before the establishment of the Policy, secondary school unit cost was on
average 14.4 percent higher than that of the elementary schools. The negative
coefficient of Construction cycle indicates countercyclical behavior for final cost but the
parameter estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero. The final cost
increases with the number of bidders for the project and this result is statistically highly
significant (p=.003). All else being constant, an increase in the number of bidders (at
the mean) raises the square-meter final cost by 3.3 percent. This is consistent with the
optimum bidding behavior of contractors who realize that they are susceptible to the
“winner’s curse.” Contractors face collective uncertainty over the cost of the project
prior to the SDFWP and, as economic theory suggests, they increase their bid prices
in response to an increase in the number of bidders. 
The third column shows that after the SDFWP secondary school unit cost was still
higher than that of the elementary but now only by 5.6 percent and this result is not
statistically significant. Final cost is pro-cyclical and, again, the result is statistically
significant (p=.03): a one percent increase above the trend growth raised the
square-meter cost by approximately 0.7 percent. The most striking effect of the
SDFWP concerns the impact of the number of bidders. The sign of the coefficient is
now positive (p=.03): a unit increase in the number of bidders (at the mean) now
lowers the unit final cost by 1.8 percent. In comparison with the pre-SDFWP period,
this finding suggests a change in the type of uncertainty facing the bidders. It is now
private uncertainty, rather than collective, that is more relevant in the bidding process
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and rising competition induces contractors to lower their mark-ups (and consequently
bids and final cost) in order to increase the probability of winning the contract.(FN25)
In order to compare average unit costs of the pre and post-SDFWP periods we
predicted the construction cost of an elementary school in school district 6. We
assumed that the building permits grow at the trend rate and that eight contractors
make bids for the project. Under these assumptions, the predicted average construction
cost is $1,238 before the SDFWP and $1,313 afterwards. This cost differential is not
statistically significantly different from zero. The 95 percent confidence interval for the
pre-SDFWP prediction ($1,097-$1,397) includes the post-SDFWP figure. 
The remaining three columns of Table 3 report estimation results of the specification
including the time index. Estimation of this specification yields results that are
consistent with those reported earlier. Again the hypothesis of structural stability of
coefficients across the two periods is rejected at the one percent level (F-value=5.20).
In the pre-SDFWP period secondary schools are more expensive to build by 12.5
percent (p=.02). The cost of construction is varies directly with the number of bidders.
An increase in the number of bidders (at the mean) is estimated to raise the final cost
by 2.0 percent (p=.09). Unit construction cost is also estimated to rise at 0.6 percent
per month (p=.08). In the post-SDFWP period, the type of school no longer makes a
difference on the cost of construction. Similar to the earlier finding reported on column
(3), final cost is inversely related to the number of bidders. It declines by 2.27 percent
in response to a unit rise in the number of bidders (at the mean). The final price also
declines by 0.05 percent per month in the post-SDFWP period. Final cost is not
responsive to the business cycle in either period. While the theory does not predict an
unambiguous sign for the coefficient of this variable, it should still be remembered that
quarterly data on business cycles would have yielded more reliable assessment of the
cyclical behavior of the final school construction costs. 
We again predicted the average cost of construction under the assumptions stated
above. These predictions do not indicate a significant change in the cost of
construction following the establishment of the SDFWP. The predicted cost increased
gradually between January 1989 and March 1992, reaching $1,347 just before the
establishment of the SDFWP. At the end of March 1992, the SDFWP was established.
On April 1992, the predicted price jumped to $1,474, and then it declined gradually. It
took about 20 months for the price to decline to its March 1992 level. 
CONCLUSION
A number of politicians and school officials proposed the elimination of prevailing
wage regulations as a means to lower public school construction costs. The B.C. data,
at first sight, seem to support this view. The bi-variate “before and after” comparison
of final unit price indicate that the SDFWP caused the construction cost to increase by
16 percent, even higher than some of the figures estimated by the critiques of the U.S.
prevailing wage laws. This difference is also found to be statistically highly significant.
However, when the same experiment is carried out controlling for other factors
including the construction business cycle, number of competitors, type of school, district
dummies, and the time trend, this result no longer holds. There is indeed a structural
break in the determination of the final cost after the SDFWP, but there is no evidence
of a significant change in the unit costs after the establishment of the SDFWP. Instead,
what is observed is a 6.1 percent increase in price, if the impact of the time trend is
ignored. No statistical significance can be attached to this figure. If time trend is also
included in the analysis, the price rises by 9.4 percent at the time of introduction of
the Policy followed by a steady decline afterwards. This steady decline, over time,
offsets the immediate inflationary cost impact. These findings indicate that the appeal
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for the repeal of prevailing wage laws to reduce the school construction costs and the
burden on the public budget is misguided. 
Regression results also indicate that the prevailing wage affects construction costs
through a variety of subtle channels that are overlooked in the literature. Present
findings suggest two factors playing important roles in cost determination. The first is
the impact of competition on the final price. The final price is directly (inversely) related
to the number of bidders before (after) the SDFWP. This finding supports the
hypothesis that the SDFWP altered the nature of uncertainty facing the bidders and
made bid surcharges to avoid the winner’s curse unnecessary. The second factor is
the trend change. We do not know exactly which factors lie behind the rising trend
costs in the pre-SDFWP and declining trend of the post-SDFWP periods. Possible
answers to this question may lie in the areas of technological and non-wage regulatory
changes, as well as the learning behavior of contractors and their adjustment process
to the changing regulatory environment. 
ADDED MATERIAL 
Cihan Bilginsoy is an Associate Professor and Peter Philips is a Professor in the
Department of Economics, University of Utah. 
TABLE 1 SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN SIX B.C. DISTRICTS:
1989-1995 
                      No. of Obs.    Post-SDFWP    Whole Period
Elementary schools      18                 21           39
Secondary schools        7                  8           15
All schools             25                 29           54
TABLE 2 FINAL SQUARE-METER SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION COST (IN 1989
PRICES — CAN.$) 
              No. of Obs.     Mean          Median    Stan. Dev.         Range
All Tenders       54         $1,423         $1,440       $217        $968-1,811
Pre-SDFWP         25          1,308(FNa)     1,248        189         968-1,690
Post-SDFWP        29          1,515(FNa)     1,508        195       1,194-1,811
Note: We tested the hypotheses that means and standard deviations of the
post-SDFWP periods are equal to their pre-SDFWP counterparts (one-tailed tests).
Superscript a indicates that the hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level. 
TABLE 3 REGRESSION MODEL FOR FINAL COST 
                                     Specification 1                                    Specification 2
                      Whole               Pre-               Post-               Whole              Pre-                Post-
                      Period             SDFWP              SDFWP                Period            SDFWP               SDFWP
                        (1)                 (2)               (3)                  (4)               (5)                 (6)
Constant                7.272              7.379              7.007               7.118              7.115              7.260
                      (88.30)(FN***)     (81.84)(FN***)     (70.39)(FN***)      (76.11)(FN***)     (42.97)(FN***)
(49.28)(FN***)
School type             0.090              0.144              0.056               0.094              0.125            0.040
(=1 if secondary)      (1.94)(FN*)        (3.03)(FN***)      (1.26)              (2.56)(FN**)       (2.75)(FN**)     (0.97)
Construction            0.007             -0.008              0.007               0.008             -0.009           -0.002
 Cycle                 (1.94)(FN**)       (1.24)             (2.27)(FN**)        (2.47)(FN**)       (1.50)           (0.45)
1/(No. of bidders)     -0.646             -2.063              1.390              -0.380             -1.268            1.757
                       (1.31)             (3.50)(FN***)      (2.36)(FN**)        (0.81)             (1.82)(FN*)
(3.11)(FN***)
Time                                                                              0.002              0.006           -0.005
                                                                                 (2.85)(FN***)      (1.85)(FN*)
(2.18)(FN**)
District dummies      Included           Included           Included            Included           Included
Included
R2                    0.43               0.70               0.63                0.52               0.76               0.71
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Adj. R2               0.33               0.55               0.48                0.42               0.61               0.57
F                     4.19(FN***)        4.74(FN***)        4.28(FN***)         5.21(FN***)        5.23(FN***)
5.05(FN***)
Observations         54                 25                 29                  54                 25                 29
Note: Dependent variable is the natural log of square-meter cost. t-statistics in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. 
FOOTNOTES
1. D.C. Thompson, R.C. Wood and D.S. Honeyman state in Fiscal Leadership for
Schools (New York: Longman, 1994), 553: “it is truly startling to recognize that almost
half of all school buildings in the nation have only marginal future utility, and another
20%-30% are candidates for reconstruction or abandonment because they are more
than 50 years old.” 
2. The first state prevailing wage law passed in Kansas in 1891. Eventually 41 states
would adopt such legislation. Between 1979 and 1988, nine states repealed their
prevailing wage laws. In 1995, Oklahoma’s law was judicially overturned and in 1997
Ohio exempted school construction from the purview of its prevailing wage law. The
federal Davis Bacon Act was passed in 1931. Because most public school construction
does not include federal funds in the U.S., public school construction is regulated by
state laws. 
3. “...without the constraint of the Little Davis-Bacon Act, we could build four schools
instead of three for the same amount of money,” New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson,
State of the State Address, January 16, 1996. 
4. Rick Savors, Ohio School Boards Association Deputy Director of Legislative
Networks, Testimony on Ohio Senate Bill 102, May 8, 1997. 
5. Richard Maxwell, Testimony on Ohio Senate Bill 102, May 8, 1997. 
6. Jim Shirey, Testimony on Ohio Senate Bill 102, May 8, 1997 (emphasis in the
original). 
7. This result is from the U.S. Census of the Construction Industry, 1992, Industry
Series, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, GPO,
CC92-I-27, 1997), Table 3, pp.27-28. There is no comparable construction census for
Canada. The data are for contractors with payroll. The numerator of the ratio of labor
costs to total costs includes total wages paid to construction workers plus the value of
both legally mandated benefits (such as social security) and voluntary benefits (such
as a private pension) paid for by the employer. This benefit figure includes not only
benefits paid to construction workers but also to all other clerical and support workers
employed by construction contractors. Thus, this is an overestimate of the wages and
benefits paid to workers covered by prevailing wage regulations. The denominator is
the net value of construction work done. This figure avoids double counting associated
with subcontracting. 
Anecdotally construction contractors sometimes report higher labor costs as a
percent of total costs. While labor costs as a percent of total costs vary among
contractors and any one contractor is unlikely to reflect the average, anecdotal reports
suffer from a second handicap. Often when contractors calculate their labor costs as
a percent of total costs, they are thinking of labor costs to them. Consequently they
exclude their charge for capital depreciation and profit to the purchaser of their
services. The U.S. Census of Construction figure includes the contractor’s markup in
the total costs paid by the owner or purchaser of the construction. This is the relevant
figure when trying to assess the effect of a savings on labor costs to school board
construction costs. 
8. Davis Bacon periodically surveys counties. Davis Bacon sets the “prevailing” wage
rate at the modal rate found in the survey for specific occupations if the mode
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accounts for 50 percent plus one wage rates found. Otherwise, the average wage rate
is said to prevail. 
9. See D.N. Gujarati, “The Economics of the Davis-Bacon Act,” Journal of Business 40
(1967): 303-316; GAO, The Davis-Bacon Act Should Be Repealed (Washington, D.C.:
GAO, 1979); GAO, Modifying the Davis-Bacon Act: Implications for the Labor Market
and the Federal Budget (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1981); R.S. Goldfarb and J.F.
Morrall, “Cost Implications of Changing Davis-Bacon Administration,” Policy Analysis 4
(1978): 439-453; R.S. Goldfarb and J.F. Morrall, “The Davis-Bacon Act: An Appraisal
of Recent Studies,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 (1981): 191-206; J.P.
Gould, Davis-Bacon Act: The Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971); J.P. Gould and G.
Bittlingmayer, The Economics of Davis-Bacon Act: An Analysis of Prevailing Wage
Laws (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1980); A.J. Thieblot, Jr., Prevailing Wage Legislation: The Davis Bacon Act, State
“Little Davis-Bacon” Acts, The Walsh-Healey Act, and The Service Contract Act
(Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, 1986). 
10. C.C. Bourdon and R.E. Levitt, Union and Open Shop Construction (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1980). 
11. S.G. Allen, “Much Ado about Davis-Bacon: A Critical Review and New Evidence,”
Journal of Law and Economics 25 (1983): 707-736. 
12. Armand J. Thieblot, Jr., The Davis-Bacon Act (Philadelphia: Industrial Research
Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1975). 
13. Thieblot, Prevailing Wage Legislation, 105-106. 
14. M. Fraundorf, J.P. Farrell. Robert Mason, “The Effect of the Davis-Bacon Act on
Construction Costs in Rural Areas,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 66 (1983):
142-146. 
15. Government of Canada, “The Impact of Skills Development and fair Wage Policy
on Construction Costs in British Columbia: An Empirical Analysis of Some Key Issues,”
(1997). 
16. All prices are in Canadian dollars. 
17. The mark-up on change order is likely to be different from m because the change
order price is negotiated separately. Dyer and Kagel argue on the basis of U.S. field
data that contractors who underbid may use these negotiations to recover their losses.
See D. Dyer and J.H. Kagel, “Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the
Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner’s Curse,” Management
Science 42 (1996): 1463-1475. 
18. Only the gross area size information is available. 
19. R.H. Thaler, “The Winner’s Curse,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1988):
191-201; P. Milgrom, “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3 (1989): 3-21. 
20. For econometric evidence supporting the hypothesis that competition and bid prices
were related directly in the pre-SDFWP period and inversely in the post-SDFWP
period, see CihanBilginsoy, “Labor Market Regulation and the Winner’s Curse,”
Economic Inquiry 37 (1999): 387-400. 
21. We identified six size categories in terms of average volume of sales: less than
$15 million, $15 to 30 million, $30 to 60 million, $60 to 100 million, $100 to 200
million, and above $200 million. 
22. See Charles T. Jahren and Andrew M. Ashe, “Predictors of Cost-Overrun Rates,”
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 116 (1990): 548-552. 
23. See Dyer and Kagel, “Bidding in Common Value Auctions,” at 1470. 
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24. In B.C., school construction specifications, including building, mechanical and
electrical codes, were changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in order to make
structures more earthquake resilient. 
25. The assumption of exogeneity of the number of bidders deserves further comment.
The number of bidders may be exogenously determined if the bid/no-bid decision is
influenced by the desirability of the project. If so, the number of bidders would no
longer be an appropriate measure of the degree of competition, and the estimated
parameters would be biased and inefficient. In the economics of auctions literature it
is suggested that the decision to bid would be affected by factors including the
variance of the estimated value of the project and asymmetric distribution of
information across the bidders. These factors were shown to be significant in the outer
continental shelf (OCS) hydrocarbon lease auctions. See O.W. Gilley and G.V. Karels,
“The Competitive Effect of Bonus Bidding: New Evidence,” The Bell Journal of
Economics 12 (1981): 637-648; K. Hendricks and R.H. Porter, “An Empirical Study of
an Auction with Asymmetric Information,” American Economic Review 78 (1988):
865-883. In addition, in school construction some contractors may chose not to bid in
school districts that are difficult to work with. These problems are not serious in our
sample because school construction is a far more standard item to bid in comparison
with the OCS leases and the scope of asymmetric information across contractors, if
any exists, is likely to be very narrow. The variance of the submitted bids for any
project suggests a much smaller variation in cost estimates. Inspection of “special
features” in the architect’s cost estimation forms indicates little variation across projects
and between the pre- and post-SDFWP periods, and supports these contentions.
Finally, the spread of the average number of bidders across districts is quite narrow,
ranging from 7.3 to 9.3, and do not suggest that contractors deem any district to be
less desirable than the others. 
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